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Abstract:  This paper investigates how the supplier’s bargaining power affects trade credit supply. We 
use a novel firm-level database of Chinese firms with unique information on the amount, terms, and 
payment history of trade credit extended to customers and detailed information on product market 
structure and clients-supplier relationships. We document that suppliers with weak bargaining power 
towards their customers are more likely to extend trade credit, have a larger share of goods sold on credit, 
and offer a longer payment period before imposing penalties. Important customers extend the payment 
period beyond what has been offered by their supplier and generate overdue payments. Furthermore, 
weak bargaining power suppliers are less likely to offer trade credit when credit-constrained by banks. 
Our findings suggest that suppliers use trade credit as a competitive device in the product market. 
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“Large, creditworthy buyers force longer payment terms on less creditworthy suppliers.  Large 
creditworthy suppliers incent less credit worthy SME buyers to pay more quickly”  
CFO Magazine, April 2007 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Trade credit is an important source of funds for both small and large firms around the world 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). Many firms use trade credit 
both to finance their input purchases (accounts payable) and offer financing to their customers 
(accounts receivable).  
A number of papers have investigated both the demand and supply side of trade credit. 
However, we still know very little about important features of trade credit contracts offered and 
about whether customers stick to these contract terms. Moreover, there is evidence that small 
credit constrained firms do offer trade credit (e.g., McMillan and Woodruff, 1999 and Marotta, 
2005), but it is not clear why they would do that.  
Anecdotal evidence (CFO Magazine, April 2007), suggests that the bargaining power 
between suppliers and customers is an important driver of both the trade credit terms offered by 
suppliers and the ones actually used by customers. Bargaining power might also explain why 
credit-constrained suppliers still offer trade credit: when they are forced by influential buyers to 
allow delayed repayments of goods.  
Motivated by the scarce empirical evidence on trade credit terms and bargaining power, 
we collect a large and detailed firm-level survey database of Chinese firms. This is a unique 
source of data for at least two reasons. First, it provides unique information on trade credit 
contracts, including the amount, terms, and payment history of trade credit extended by firms to 
their customers (accounts receivable). Second, it provides detailed and rich information about the 
product market environment (i.e., number of competitors and main competitor’s share in the 
domestic market), the business relation between suppliers and customers and the characteristics 
of the goods sold on credit.  
Our empirical analysis provides a number of intriguing results. First, we document the 
importance of trade credit as a competitive gesture. Specifically, suppliers with weak bargaining 
power towards their customers – measured as either the proportion of sales to the largest 
customer or the number of suppliers of the firm’s most important customer – are more likely to 
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extend trade credit, have a larger share of goods sold on credit, and offer a longer payment 
period before imposing penalties. Similarly, firms facing stronger competition in the product 
market – measured either by the degree of sales concentration in the domestic market, by the 
introduction of new products, or by lowered product prices in the past year - are more likely to 
offer trade credit and provide better credit terms. Evidence on customers’ repayments practices 
confirms these findings and suggests that influential customers generate involuntary lending 
from their weaker suppliers. Specifically, important customers repay slowly their purchases and 
tend to extend the payment period beyond what has been offered, generating overdue payments. 
Finally, we look at how firms finance the provision of trade credit. We find that unused 
bank credit lines increase credit supply but only for suppliers with weak bargaining power, 
suggesting that credit-constrained firms are less able to compete in the product market when they 
most need it. All these findings are consistent with the bargaining power story and hold after 
controlling for several firm characteristics, including size, ownership, geographical location, 
market destination of the products, number of customers, and industry dummies.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on trade credit along several dimensions. First, our 
data set provides an ideal setting to effectively test three theories that have linked the buyer/seller 
bargaining power to trade credit decisions. Specifically, our evidence provides support to the 
Wilner’s (2000) argument that a customer obtains more trade credit if he generates a large 
percentage of the supplier’s profits. Our evidence is also in line with the prediction of Fisman 
and Raturi (2004) that trade credit is larger when the product market is more competitive. 
Finally, we do not find significant support for the Cun͂at’s (2007) hypothesis that trade credit is 
higher when the good sold is tailored to the buyer specific needs and suppliers and customers are 
in a sort of bilateral monopoly because of high switching costs. Interestingly, some of our 
proxies of bargaining power are a very close match to the theoretical predictions of the three 
models, as we observe the percentage of sales to the largest customer, the degree of sales 
concentration in the product market, and the percentage of goods sold tailored to the buyer’s 
specific needs.  
Our analysis also complements and extends the empirical literature. Extant evidence is 
based mainly on the decision to extend trade credit and its link with the degree of competition in 
product markets, but presents somewhat conflicting results (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; 
Fisman and Raturi, 2004). We use a comprehensive set of measures on both trade credit terms 
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and bargaining power that allows us to obtain more compelling evidence of a negative relation 
between supplier bargaining power and trade credit provision. 
Finally, our paper is related to the literature analyzing the role of trade credit in 
developing economies (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Fisman and Love, 2003; Johnson 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005; Cull, Xu and Zhu, 2008).  The 
general idea in this literature is that trade credit can offer a viable substitute for formal bank 
credit in countries with low levels of financial development. Cull, Xu and Zhu (2008) do not find 
support for this theory in a sample of Chinese firms.1  Rather, they argue that the high growth 
rate in China is fueled by a growing private sector with increasing competitive pressure, which is 
likely to be an important motivation for the use of trade credit. Our results are in line with their 
argument.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
literature and derives our testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our 
empirical results. Section 5 discusses a series of robustness checks and additional results. Section 
6 concludes. 
   
2. Related literature and testable hypotheses 
The traditional explanation for the existence of trade credit is that trade credit plays a 
nonfinancial role. That is, trade credit reduces transaction costs (Ferris, 1981), allows price 
discrimination between customers with different credit-worthiness (Brennan, Maksimovic, and 
Zechner, 1988), fosters long-term relations with customers (Summers and Wilson, 2002), and 
even provides a warranty for quality when customers cannot observe product characteristics 
(Long, Malitz and Ravid, 1993). More recently, financial theories argue that suppliers have a 
lending advantage over financial institutions, due to better information (Biais and Gollier, 1997), 
lower borrower’s opportunism (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004), or a liquidation advantage (Fabbri 
and Menichini, 2010). This paper focuses on those theories that link the decision to offer trade 
credit to the strength of the supplier/customer relation. For example, Wilner (2000) builds on a 
simple intuition that if a buyer depends a lot on a seller, the seller is in a better position to force 
immediate payment. And vice-versa, if a seller depends strongly on a buyer’s purchase, the 
                                                 
1 They focus on differences in ownership structures, since in China it is not so much the lack of a formal financial 
system but rather its institutional bias in favor of state-owned enterprises that could give rise to trade credit among 
viable firms with restricted or no access to credit from state-owned banks. 
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buyer could delay payment more often. In particular, Wilner’s (2000) model predicts higher 
trade credit when the customer’s purchases count for a larger share of the firm’s profits, i.e. 
when the supplier’s bargaining power is low. The implications of this theory, extended to include 
trade credit terms, generate the following prediction:    
HP1: When customer’s purchase count for a larger share of supplier’s sales, the supplier 
is more likely to offer trade credit, the amount of goods sold on credit is higher, and the offered 
trade credit terms are better. 
 
The supplier’s bargaining power might depend on the degree of competition in the 
product market. When the product market is very competitive because many firms supply 
homogenous goods, profit margins are low. Each supplier of the good is in a weak position to 
enforce payments and is eager to allow delayed repayments to attract new customers, or to 
prevent existing customers from switching to a different supplier. The opposite is true when the 
supplier is a monopolist. It follows that supplier’s market power is negatively associated with 
trade credit provision. Fisman and Raturi (2004) obtain this prediction in a setting where 
customers have to take specific up-front investments to establish their creditworthiness for the 
credit to be provided. It follows that in less competitive markets, customers have less incentive to 
do that, because of holdup problems in the future, and thus less trade credit is provided. The 
implications of this theory, extended to include trade credit terms, generate the following 
prediction:   
HP2: When the product market is more competitive, the supplier is more likely to offer 
trade credit, the amount of goods sold on credit is higher, and the offered trade credit terms are 
better. 
 
Cun͂at (2007) proposes another theory, which is related to the bargaining power 
hypothesis. His model predicts higher levels of trade credit when both buyers and suppliers are in 
a sort of bilateral monopoly (e.g., low competition), due to the higher switching costs on both 
sides. According to Cun͂at (2007), intermediate goods tailored to the specific needs of the buyer 
make both suppliers and customers difficult to substitute. This theory has two implications for 
our analysis: First, it shows that product characteristics, like standardization, can affect the 
degree of effective competition faced by the supplier and, more generally, the bargaining power 
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of the supplier vis-à-vis the customer. Second, this theory predicts higher trade credit when both 
suppliers and customers have strong bargaining power (or competition is low). The implications 
of Cun͂at (2007), extended to trade credit terms, generate the following prediction: 
HP3: When intermediate goods are tailored to the specific needs of the buyer, the 
supplier is more likely to offer trade credit, the amount of goods sold on credit is higher, and the 
trade credit terms are better. 
 
By offering credit to its customers, the firm postpones its receipt of cash payments and 
needs to finance its own provision of credit. Firms can use bank credit, if they have access to 
external finance. Existing literature provides both evidence (Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and 
theoretical explanations (e.g., Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Bias and Gollier, 1997) for larger 
trade credit demand by credit-constrained firms. In contrast, there is no clear-cut evidence that 
credit constraints affect trade credit supply. For example, Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen 
(2011) find that the availability of a line of credit does not affect the amount of trade credit 
offered. We argue that financial constraints might have a differential effect on trade credit, 
depending on whether firms are in need or not to offer trade credit. If the supplier is dealing with 
an important customer (or faces high competition in the product market), she has a stronger need 
to finance the supply of trade credit. However, credit constraints not necessarily affect trade 
credit supply in less competitive markets. We thus test the following prediction: 
HP4: When firms with weak bargaining power are credit constrained, they are less likely 
to supply trade credit, allow a smaller share of goods to be paid on account, and offer worse 
credit terms. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
  We use firm-level data on about 2,500 Chinese firms, which was collected as part of the 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World Bank with partners in 76 developed and 
developing countries. The dataset includes a large, randomly selected sample of firms across 12 
two-digit manufacturing and service sectors. The surveys include both quantitative and 
qualitative information on barriers to growth, including sources of finance, regulatory burdens, 
innovations, access to infrastructure services, legal difficulties, and corruption. One limitation of 
the database is that only limited accounting (balance sheet) data is surveyed.  In addition, in 
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many countries (including China) the survey excludes firms with less than four years of age, in 
order to complete questions on firm performance and behavior relative to three-years earlier. 
 We use the 2003 World Bank Enterprise Survey for China2, which is the only country 
survey to include detailed questions on trade credit contract terms offered, as well as additional 
questions on the product market environment - the number and importance of customers, the 
number of competitors and their market shares - and on the characteristics of supplier-customer 
relation. For the purpose of our analysis, the key questions regard the extension and terms of 
trade credit.  Importantly, the survey asks, (i) whether firms offer trade credit to customers, (ii) 
the percentage of monthly sales sold on credit, (iii) whether firms offer discount to customers 
who pay in cash, (iv) how long firms allow customer to use trade credit, (v) on average, how fast 
suppliers get the actual payments, and finally, (vi) what percentage of annual sales involves 
overdue payments from customers. In our sample, about 90% of firms report whether or not they 
extend trade credit to their customers.  
Table 1 shows the variable definitions and their means. We include measures of trade 
credit, general firm characteristics, indicators of market power of the firm relative to its 
customers, access to bank financing, length of the supplier-customer relation, and product 
characteristics of the goods sold on credit. Detailed summary statistics are shown in Table 2 for 
the full sample. Table 3 divides the sample in two groups, firms that offer trade credit 
(AR_dum=1) and firms that do not offer trade credit (AR_dum=0), and shows the mean 
difference and its statistical significance for all our explanatory variables, including firm’s 
characteristics (Panel A) and our proxies of bargaining power (Panel B). Table 4 breaks down 
one proxy of bargaining power between firms offering and not offering trade credit, across all 
sectors and the main firm’s characteristics. Finally, Table 5 shows correlation matrices for all 
variables.   
 
3.1 Trade credit variables 
Our main dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm offers trade 
credit (accounts receivable), and zero otherwise (AR_d).  We find that 39% of the firms in our 
sample offer trade credit and that the full-sample average percentage of goods sold on credit is 
14% (AR_per), increasing to 35% for the subsample of firms that offer trade credit. On average, 
                                                 
2 For additional information on the World Bank Enterprise Survey for China, see Ayyagari, et al. (2010). 
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firms that extend trade credit offer customers about one month to pay, with clustering on some 
payment periods. For example, 37% of the suppliers offer a payment period of 30 days, 16% 
offer 60 days, 18% offer 90 days, and 9% offer 180 days. Since sector characteristics affect 
offered payment periods (Ng, Smith, and Smith, 1997), we use a dummy variable equal to one if 
the firm offers a payment period longer than the sector average, and zero otherwise (AR_days). 
Finally, we find that 20% of firms that offer trade credit offer a prepayment discount 
(AR_discount). 
Our data set also allows us to examine the payment performance of customers (i.e., the 
collection of accounts receivables). First, we construct a dummy variable (AR_daysover) equal to 
one if the days actually used to repay are greater than the days offered by suppliers (customers 
pay late); the dummy is equal to 0 otherwise, i.e., when customers pay on time or prepay. In our 
sample, 28% of the firms receive late payments, 35% of firms receive early payments, and 37% 
receive timely payments. Next, we compute the percentage of annual sales that involve overdue 
payments (AR_overdue). We find that on average 19% of the annual sales involve overdue 
payments. 
 
3.1.1 Sample comparisons  
We perform a number of empirical tests to verify that our sample is representative of 
China at the national level and we compare the use of trade credit in China versus other 
developing and developed economies. First, Cull et al. (2008) use a large data set of over 
100,000 industrial private Chinese firms and find an average percentage of sales financed by 
accounts receivable of 18%.3 This compares well to the 14% in our sample of firms (AR_per), 
suggesting that our random sample of Chinese firms is indeed nationally representative. 
We also find that the use of trade credit in China is comparable to other countries.  For 
example, using the complete World Bank Enterprise Survey database of over 100 developed and 
developing countries, we find that the average number of firms using trade credit for working 
capital or investment purposes (the only comparative variable available across countries) is 45% 
in our China sample, and 51% for the complete set of countries. In addition, the average 
percentage of trade credit used for working capital purposes (averaged across firms that use trade 
credit) is 48% of total working capital financing in China, versus 44% for the complete sample.   
                                                 
3 Cull et al. (2008) data set is for 2003 and does not include additional contract information on accounts payables.  
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There are some differences on the use of trade credit in comparison to the U.S.. 
According to the Federal Reserve Survey of Small Business Financing (SSBF) database of U.S. 
firms, about 65% of firms use trade credit (account payables) to finance supplier purchases, as 
opposed to 45% in our sample of Chinese firms. Furthermore, the percentage of purchases 
financed by trade credit is 20% among U.S. SMEs that take trade credit from suppliers (versus 
10% in our sample of Chinese firms) and 20% of firms that use trade credit are offered an early 
payment discount from their suppliers (in comparison to 7% in our sample of Chinese firms).4 In 
summary, the Chinese trade credit data is representative of the country, highly comparable to the 
average in developed and developing countries, and not too different compared to the U.S.   
 
3.2 Firm and industry characteristics 
We include in all regressions some general firm characteristics that are likely to be 
associated with trade credit. First, the number of years since the firm was established in 
logarithm (Age). Second, the number of total employees (including contractual employees) in log 
(Emp), as a proxy for firm size. All our empirical results are robust to using alternative measures 
of firm size, such as dummies indicating small, medium, and large firms. Likewise, we get 
similar results if we replace the log of total employment with the log of total sales, although we 
are less comfortable using accounting data because of the large number of missing observations 
and unaudited firms in our sample. Third, we include the log of the number of customers the 
supplier is dealing with (No_customers), to account for any mechanical relation between the 
number of customers and the likelihood to offer trade credit or the amount offered.  Fourth, we 
include a dummy variable equal to one if the percentage of the firm owned by foreign 
individuals, foreign investors, foreign firms, and foreign banks is greater than 50%, and equal to 
zero otherwise (Foreign). Fifth, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the percentage of 
the firm owned by the government (national, state, and local government, and 
cooperative/collective enterprises) is greater than 50% (State). We include these ownership 
dummy variables to control for possible preferential access to financing from foreign and state-
owned banks, respectively. It might also be the case that foreign and state-owned firms have 
preferential foreign and government product markets, respectively, and are not as sensitive to 
                                                 
4 These comparisons refer to accounts payable. All the U.S. firm statistics are from Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen 
(2011).  
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market competition.  In our sample, 7% of firms are foreign-owned, while 23% are state-owned. 
All results are robust to using a 30% cutoff (instead of 50% cutoff) to identify foreign and state 
ownership. Sixth, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the firm sells its products abroad 
and equal to zero otherwise (Export). We include this variable to control for possible differences 
in trade credit use among national and foreign customers. In our sample, 9% of firms are 
identified as exporters.  
Next, we control for the firm’s liquidity, using the percentage of unused lines of credit 
(LC_unused). This variable is equal to zero if the firm does not have a line of bank credit. The 
average percentage of unused credit line is 7% in our sample. However, less than 30% of the 
firms have access to a line of credit from the banking sector and of these firms’ lines of credit, 
26% are unused. The low-level of financial access to the formal credit market suggests that many 
Chinese firms are likely to be credit-constrained.  
Table 3 shows that firms that extend trade credit (with AR_dum=1) are significantly more 
likely to be mature, larger, foreign and state-owned firms, export firms and firms with a larger 
unused line of credit than firms that do not offer any trade credit (with AR_dum=0).   
All regressions also include 17 city dummies and 12 industry dummies that corresponds 
to 2-digit NACE codes, which is the finest level of available sector classification.5 Industry 
dummies are supposed to control for the role of “industry standards” in setting trade credit 
contract terms.6 Additional detailed information is available on the firm’s “main business” line. 
However, this information cannot be used in our regression analysis, as there are 1,818 different 
classifications and 99% of them include only one firm. Nevertheless, we study trade credit 
patterns of firms within a few classifications that include more than 10 firms. For instance, 33 
firms are classified as “dress manufacturing”, which is a subsector of the 2-digit sector “Garment 
and Leather Products”. On average, 31% of dress manufacturing firms extend trade credit 
(versus 34% of the larger 2-digit sector they belong to). For the 11 firms that extend trade credit 
to their customers, the percentage of sales offered ranges from 10% to 100% (the median is 
20%); terms offered include 3, 4, 10, 30, 40, and 90 days; and three firms (27%) offer a discount. 
These statistics are very similar to the overarching 2-digit sector, where the median percentage of 
goods sold on credit is 18% and 22% offer a discount. When we look at other narrow industry 
                                                 
5 Similarly, Giannetti, et al. (2011) use a 2-digit industry classification to identify product specificity. 
6 We exclude from our sample 157 firms that provide financial services. 
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classifications, we find similar patterns. This small exercise suggests that our 2-digit industry 
classification is appropriate to control for the role of industry standards in setting trade credit 
terms.  
 
3.3 Measures of Bargaining Power  
 Our next set of explanatory variables concerns the bargaining power of the firm with 
respect to its customers. First, we measure the importance of the firm’s largest customer using 
the percentage of total sales that normally goes to the firm’s largest customer 
(Sales_largest_cust). On average, 25% of total sales go to the firm’s largest customer. A larger 
share implies a more important customer and thus a weaker supplier’s bargaining power. 
 Second, we measure the firm’s bargaining power with the number of suppliers (including 
the firm itself) used by its largest customer (No_supl_cust).  If the main customer uses many 
suppliers, it is less dependent on the firm – i.e., ending the relationship poses less of a risk of a 
holdup problem – and consequently this implies less market power for the firm, relative to its 
customer. Half of the firms in our sample deal with customers that have less than six suppliers 
and the average number of suppliers used by the firm’s largest customer is nine. Only 10% of 
firms have customers dealing with more than 20 suppliers. 
 Third, we construct a Herfindahl Index to measure the degree of competition in the 
domestic market. Specifically, for the main business line we have information on the percentage 
of total sales in the domestic market supplied by the firm and by its main competitor and the total 
number of competitors in this market. This information is only available for a sub-sample of 
firms. Given that we do not know the market shares of all the competitors (but the main one), we 
assume that they are all equal.7 This assumption implies that our continuous variable is a very 
noisy measure of sales’ concentration in the domestic market. As a result, we use a dummy 
variable (Herfindahl) equal to one if the concentration index is larger than the median value 
(0.21) and zero otherwise. A higher value of the concentration index implies a less competitive 
product market and therefore a stronger bargaining power of suppliers relative to their customers.  
                                                 
7 The Herfindahl index is calculated as follows: Herfindahl =(x/100)2+(y/100)2 + (Ncomp)*[(100-x-
y)/(100*Ncomp)]2, where x and y are the firm’s and the main competitor’s  market share, respectively. Ncomp is the 
total number of competitors but the main one.  
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 As a measure of bargaining power, we also include a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm has introduced a new product, or service, or business line, in the past year, assuming that 
this event would require the firm to compete with a new product (New_product).  Moreover, we 
proxy for broader changes in the competitive landscape with a dummy equal to one if, relative to 
the average of the previous year, the firm has lowered average prices on its main business line 
(Lowered_price). We implicitly assume this was a response to greater competitive pressures in 
the market. In our sample, 42% of suppliers have introduced a new product or service and 48% 
have lowered their prices. Finally, product characteristics can affect the seller-buyer relationship 
and thus the relative bargaining power. Following Cun͂at (2007), we measure the strength of the 
seller-buyer relationship with the percentage of sales made to the clients’ unique specification 
(Customized). The distribution of this variable is highly skewed. Half of the firms in our sample 
have less than 10% of customized sales, but the average percentage of sales made to clients’ 
unique specification is 37%. 
 Tables 3 and 4 provide preliminary evidence of a positive relation between weaker 
bargaining power and trade credit supply. Table 3, Panel B shows that firms extending trade 
credit (with AR_dum=1) have a weaker bargaining power than firms that do not offer trade credit 
(with AR_d=0), using all our proxies of market power, except the percentage of sales made to the 
clients’ unique specification. Table 4 breaks down the information in Table 3, Panel B and 
reports the mean value of Lower_price for firms that do and do not offer trade credit, 
disaggregated by sectors and firm’s characteristics. Table 4 strengthens our previous findings. 
Specifically, firms offering trade credit are more likely to operate in competitive markets than 
firms that do not offer trade credit in all sectors, and significantly so in nine sectors out of 12. 
Moreover, both young and mature firms, small and large firms, foreign and non foreign-
controlled firms, state and non state-controlled firms that offer trade credit are all more likely to 
operate in competitive markets than firms that do not offer trade credit. We obtain very similar 
results if we replace AR_dum with the percentage of goods sold of credit (AR_per) below and 
above the median as an indicator of trade credit supply.    
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4. Results 
In this section, we first investigate the relation between different aspects of trade credit and 
the supplier’s bargaining power. We then examine how bank credit constraints interact with the 
supply of trade credit with different degrees of bargaining power.  
 
4.1 Trade credit provision and the supplier’s bargaining power  
 Table 6 shows the results of a set of regressions where the dependent variable is the 
decision to offer trade credit, which represents the traditional dependent variable used in the 
literature. In Table 7, we exploit the richness of our data and look at the determinants of other 
trade credit terms. All regressions control for general firm characteristics, for 12 industry fixed-
effects, and for 17 city fixed-effects.   
Table 6 shows consistent evidence that a weaker supplier’s bargaining power has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the supplier’s decision to offer trade credit. For 
instance in Column 1, the larger the percentage of sales to the largest customer, the more likely 
firms are to extend trade credit, in line with our first testable hypothesis in Section 2. Moreover, 
the degree of competition faced by the supplier in the product market affects the decision to offer 
trade credit, in line with Fisman and Raturi (2004) and our second testable hypothesis: the larger 
the number of suppliers of the firm’s most important customer (Column 2), or the lower the 
degree of sale concentration in the domestic market (Column 3), the more likely firms are to 
extend trade credit. In addition, firms that have lowered prices in the past year (Column 4) or 
introduced new products (Column 5) are more likely to extend trade credit. Finally, we include 
the percentage of sales made to clients’ unique specification (Column 6) to test our third 
hypothesis. We find that selling a larger proportion of customized goods does not have a 
significant effect on the decision to offer trade credit. 
As for the other firm characteristics, there is some evidence that younger firms are more 
likely to offer trade credit (Column 1). The negative relation between firm’s age and trade credit 
supply could depend on the stronger competition that new firms face when entering the product 
market. Moreover, larger firms are more likely to extend trade credit (Column 1), which might 
be related to their longer and more established customer and supplier relationships. Our finding 
that larger and younger firms offer more trade credit is not necessarily counterintuitive in a 
developing country context, where firms often remain small over time (and fail to grow as they 
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age); for instance, the correlation between firm size and age in our sample is only 0.30 percent.8 
There is consistent evidence that firms with important foreign equity ownership and firms with a 
large number of customers have a higher probability to offer trade credit (Columns 1 to 6). In 
general, we find no significant relationship between the decision to offer trade credit and state 
ownership. Finally, there is some evidence that exporting firms have a lower probability of 
offering trade credit (Columns 2 and 4 to 6), which might be explained by the difficulty in 
collecting late payments overseas or litigating in a foreign court.  
Table 7 extends the analysis to the effect of bargaining power on the other trade credit 
terms. The dependent variable is either the percentage of goods sold on credit (AR_per), or the 
offered payment period (AR_days), or the decision to offer a prepayment discount 
(AR_discount). We also look at the customers’ payment history including the difference between 
the number of days used versus offered to repay (AR_daysover), and the share of overdue 
payments (AR_overdue).9 Specifically, Table 7 shows that our proxies of low bargaining power, 
namely suppliers dealing with important customers (Panel A) and facing increased competition 
in the product market (Panel B), are associated with a larger share of goods sold on account and 
longer payment periods offered before imposing penalties. We do not find evidence that the 
supplier’s bargaining power affects the likelihood to offer a prepayment discount. This is 
consistent with the finding of Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2012) that discounts for early payment 
are offered to riskier buyers to limit their potential non-payment risk. Table 7 also shows that 
important customers actually extend the payment period beyond what has been offered to them 
and their suppliers have a larger percentage of sales involving overdue payments. We obtain 
similar results (not shown) if we measure the bargaining power of the supplier with the number 
of total suppliers used by the main customer (No_supl_cust) or with a dummy indicating whether 
the firm has introduced a new product (New_product).10 
When we look at the other firm’s characteristics, Table 7 shows that larger firms have 
more goods sold on credit and a lower share of overdue payments (Columns 1 and 5 in Panels A 
and B). We do not find significant relationships between foreign ownership and credit terms. 
                                                 
8 For additional discussion, see Klapper, et al. (2006), which shows that the relationship between age and size 
(measured by value added) is smaller in countries with weaker business environments. 
9 Note that the dependent variables AR_days, AR_discount, AR_daysover, and AR_overdue  are constructed using 
only firms that offer trade credit (i.e., AR_d=1). 
10 These results are not shown to save space, but are available upon request. 
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State-owned firms are associated with customers extending the payment period beyond what has 
been offered by their suppliers (Column 4 in both panels).  
Overall our findings provide empirical support for our testable hypotheses 1 and 2 and are 
consistent with the idea that trade credit might be used as a competitive device to reduce actual 
competition, prevent entry, attract new customers or avoid losing the existing ones. In all these 
cases, trade credit can become crucial for the survival of the firm. For example, a one-standard 
deviation positive shock to product market competition (measured by Sales_largest_cust) 
increases the likelihood to offer trade credit (AR_dum) by about 0.14 percentage points, which 
represents 36% of the average likelihood. The same shock also increases the share of goods sold 
on credit (AR_per) by about 3%, which corresponds to about 20% of the average amount of trade 
credit offered. Both figures suggest that the effect of competition on trade credit supply is 
economically very relevant. The economic significance is even stronger when we use other 
measures of bargaining power like Lower_price or New_product.  
 
 4.2 How do suppliers in competitive market finance trade credit provision?   
In our sample, 847 firms offer trade credit and 81% of them have no credit lines. 
Suppliers offering trade credit are more likely to have a larger unused credit line (LC_unused), as 
shown in Table 3. Overall this preliminary evidence suggests that the lack of bank financing is 
likely to affect trade credit decisions. However, when we control for unused bank credit lines in a 
regression analysis, we do not find any significant effect on trade credit supply, in line with 
previous evidence (i.e., Giannetti, et al., 2011).11 This section explores further the relation among 
suppliers’ credits constraints and the decision to offer trade credit, conditioning on the supplier’s 
bargaining power. 
More specifically, Table 8 shows the effect of the variable LC_unused on the likelihood 
to offer trade credit (AR_d) and on the percentage of sales financed by trade credit (AR_per), in 
sub-samples of firms with low and high bargaining power, measured with different proxies of 
bargaining power: top/bottom quartile of sales to the largest customer (Panel A), top /bottom 
quartile of the number of suppliers used by the largest customer (Panel B), firms that have 
                                                 
11 We do not report these results to save space, but they are available on request. 
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lowered prices with respect to the previous year (Panel C), and firms that have introduced a new 
product (Panel D).  
Table 8 documents that bank credit constraints reduce trade credit supply of firms dealing 
with important customers or facing stronger competition in the product market. In contrast, 
having an unused credit line has no effect on trade credit decisions when suppliers have stronger 
bargaining power towards their customers. For example, the firms whose most important 
customer relies on more than 10 input providers are more likely to offer trade credit and sell a 
larger share of goods on account when they hold a larger proportion of unused credit lines 
(Columns 1 and 3 of Panel B). Similarly, the firms that reduced prices or introduced a new 
product are more likely to offer trade credit and sell a larger share of goods on account when 
they have a larger percentage of unused credit lines (Columns 1 and 3 of Panels C and D). 
Overall, these findings provide empirical support to our testable Hypothesis 4. 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we present several robustness checks. We first investigate whether our 
findings can be consistent with the supplier’s information advantage hypothesis and with the 
warrantee for product quality theory. We then show that our results still hold when we replicate 
our analysis for some selected industries and subsamples of firms.  
 
5.1 Bargaining power versus information advantage 
One could argue that the percentage of sales to the biggest customer (Sales_largest_cust) 
could also capture an advantage in information requisition by the supplier, which leads him to 
provide credit to his customer, as theoretically shown by Bias and Gollier (1997) or Burkart and 
Ellingsen (2004). If this is the case, we should find that our proxy of bargaining power is not 
significant anymore, once we control for the supplier having some information advantages over 
the buyer’s project quality, or about the buyer’s deception of other firms. 
We measure the supplier’s information advantage in three different ways. First, our survey 
asks the supplier whether he would be able to find out if one of his main clients deceives another 
firm. We use this survey question to construct a dummy variable that takes value equal to one for 
a positive answer and zero otherwise (Info_adv). Our second and third proxies are based on the 
idea that the supplier’s information advantage is a natural by-product of its business. Suppliers 
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are often in the same industry as their clients and they often visit their customers’ premises. 
Therefore the information advantage is likely to depend on the proximity between buyers and 
suppliers and on the length of their relationship. Our survey provides information on the 
percentage of sales to customers located in five different areas: in the same district as the 
supplier’s plant, outside the same district but within the same city, outside the same city but 
within the same province, outside the same province by within the same country or overseas. We 
measure customer’s proximity by the percentage of sales going to customers located in the local 
market, i.e., in the same district or in the same city (Local_market). Finally, we use the average 
length of the buyer-supplier relation as a proxy of information advantage (Age_rel_customer). 
Panel A, B and C of Table 9 show the results of these robustness tests for the decision to offer 
trade credit (AR_dum), the percentage of goods sold on credit (AR_per), and the offered payment 
period (AR_days). Our proxies of supplier’s information advantage have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the percentage of goods sold on credit (column 2 of panel A and 
C) and on the offered payment period (column 3), suggesting that suppliers with better 
information about customers are indeed more likely to offer trade credit and extend longer 
payment period, in line with the supplier’s information advantage theory. However, these 
significant findings do not drive out the explanatory power of bargaining power, which has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient in all the regressions. Similar results (not shown) 
hold for the other dependent variables, such as the payment period actually used by customers 
(AR_daysover) and the percentage of overdue payments (AR_overdue). 
 
5.2 Bargaining power versus product quality  
The finding that firms introducing new products are more likely to extend trade credit 
could also be interpreted as evidence of the warranty for product quality check theory, as 
suggested by Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993) and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012). Since a 
new product involves quality uncertainty, trade credit could be offered to give the buyer the 
possibility to check the product quality before the payment is due. Alternatively, in line with Lee 
and Stowe (1993), the New_product variable could be interpreted as a proxy for complexity, 
suggesting that product risk and asymmetric information on the product market that increase 
with complexity could explain why firms offer trade credit.  
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We can control for these alternative interpretations using the percentage of sales carrying 
a warrantee (Warranty) and the percentage of products that are certified (Certified). When 
products are sold with a warranty, the buyer can return the good without incurring in extra costs, 
if the quality of the good does not meets the expected standards. Similarly, if the product sold is 
certified, product risk and asymmetric information should be lower. Thus, if the New_product 
variable proxies for quality checking needs or for the degree of complexity and uncertainty, 
rather than for bargaining power, it should not be statistically significant once we control for the 
provision of the warranty and the certification. Table 10 shows that the variable New_product is 
indeed still significant with the expected sign in all the regressions, while the percentage of sales 
carrying a warrantee and the percentage of certified products do not seem to significantly affect 
the decision to offer trade credit, the proportion of goods sold on credit, or the offered payment 
periods. 
 
5.3 Bargaining power and cross-sectional variation  
Our identification strategy exploits cross-sectional variation in trade credit supply and 
proxies of bargaining power. Table 4 provides descriptive evidence of a positive correlation 
between trade credit supply and bargaining power across most of the sectors in our sample and 
across firm’s characteristics. These preliminary findings are confirmed in our regression 
analysis, where we control for firm’s characteristics and 12 sector dummies. To provide further 
evidence that trade credit terms offered are not only exclusively driven by industry standards, in 
Table 11, we replicate the analysis of Table 6 (AR_dum) and Table 7 (AR_per) within two of the 
largest sectors: Auto & Auto Parts and Electronic Equipment. All our previous results are 
confirmed. Weaker supplier’s bargaining power (measured by Salelargest and Lower_price) is 
positively related to the decision to offer trade credit and to the percentage of goods sold on 
credit. Moreover, our results are confirmed when we restrict the sample to firms with state 
ownership below 50% (State=0), or to non-exporter firms (Export=0). Our results are also robust 
to the inclusion of a dummy variable equal to one if the firm belongs to a government sponsored 
industrial park, science park, or Export Promotion Zone (EPZ).12  
 Finally, although our data does not allow us to exploit the time-series variability of trade 
credit supply and bargaining power variables, some questions in the survey refer to past firm 
                                                 
12 Regression results are not reported here, but are available upon request. 
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activity and limited accounting information is available, both for the current and the previous 
three years. We use this limited time-series information to control for potential idiosyncratic 
shocks at the firm level. For example, we construct a set of dummy variables to control for 
whether the firm increased sales, fixed assets, or the number of total employees in the past three 
years.  These dummies are insignificant and do not affect our main results.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper uses firm-level data on about 2,500 Chinese firms to study trade credit terms 
offered by suppliers and the payment history of customers. Supplier financing is often 
overlooked in the capital structure literature, although it is arguably the most important source of 
financing for small and medium sized enterprises, particularly in countries with less developed 
financial markets. We show that firms use trade credit as a competitive gesture.  More 
specifically, suppliers are more likely to offer trade credit and better credit terms to powerful and 
important customers, who also are more likely to force payment periods longer than the ones 
offered and to generate overdue payments. Being credit constrained by banks prevents weaker 
suppliers from offering trade credit and thus reduces their ability to compete in the product 
market.   
If competition is one of the main drivers of the decision to offer trade credit, why do 
firms not simply reduce the product price instead of offering a trade credit discount? A price 
reduction is not necessarily simpler than offering trade credit. A price reduction is observable by 
competitors and can trigger their immediate reaction by causing a price war that can be 
detrimental for the full industry. Trade credit is a less aggressive and more flexible instrument. 
Moreover, the two instruments – price reduction and trade credit - could also be used as 
complement strategies. In our analysis, we use the variable Lower_price as an indicator of 
competition and find that firms that lowered their prices relative to the previous year are more 
likely to offer trade credit. This finding could be interpreted indeed as evidence of 
complementarity. 
We believe that our results shed light on trade credit behavior more broadly than the 
Chinese market. Unique features of the Chinese economy – such as the bias towards state-owned 
banks and state-owned firms – have been decreasing since 2001 (two years before our survey 
takes place) and we control for potential biases. Moreover, there are no country-specific 
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regulations on inter-firm financing. Finally, this paper focuses on the role of competition on trade 
credit decisions. While competition is relatively new in China, it is a widespread common feature 
of developed and market-based economies.  
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Table 1:  Variable Definitions and Mean Statistics 
 
Variable Name Definition Mean 
 
Measures of Trade Credit 
 
AR_dum Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm offers credit to its customers (i.e. accounts receivable), =0 if the firm does not offer trade credit 0.39 
AR_per The percent of monthly sales sold on credit 14.02 
AR_days 
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm offers a number of days larger than 
the sector average before imposing penalties to its customers , =0 
otherwise (and = . if AR_dum is =0)  
0.50 
AR_discount Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm offers a pre-payment discount on credit to its customers, =0 otherwise (and = . if AR_dum is =0) 0.20 
AR_daysover 
Dummy (0/1), =1 if  the difference between the number of days 
actually used by the customer to repay and the one offered by the 
firm is positive, =0 otherwise (and = . if AR_dum is =0) 
27.9 
AR_overdue Percentage of annual sales involving overdue payments from customers 18.63 
 
General Firm Characteristics 
 
Age Log number of years (+1) since the firm was established 2.57 
Emp Log average number of total employees (including contractual employees) 4.94 
Foreign 
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the percentage of the firm owned by foreign 
individuals, foreign institutional investors, foreign firms, and 
foreign banks is greater than 50, =0 otherwise 
0.07 
State 
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the percentage of the firm owned by the 
government (federal, state, local, and collective/cooperative 
enterprises) is greater than 50, =0 otherwise 
0.23 
Export Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm is exporting, =0 otherwise 0.09 
No_customers Log number of customers the firm supplies its goods 3.41 
 
Indicators of (Weaker) Bargaining Power of the Seller (relative to its Customers) 
 
Sales_largest_cust Log percentage of total sales that normally goes to the firm’s largest customer 2.10 
No_sup_cust Log number of suppliers used by the firm’s largest customer  1.68 
Herfindahl 
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the Herfindahl Index in the domestic market 
for the main business  line  is greater than 0.21 (the median), =0 
otherwise.  
0.50 
New_product Dummy (0/1), =1  if the firm has introduced new products (or services) in the past year, =0 otherwise 0.42 
Lowered_price 
Dummy (0/1), =1  if  on average, and relative to the average of the 
last year, the firm has lowered prices on its main business line, =0 
otherwise  
0.48 
Customized The percent of sales made to clients’ unique specification (i.e. that cannot be sold to other clients) 37.53 
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Other Firm Characteristics 
 
LC_unused 
The percent of the firm’s line of credit or overdraft facility that is 
currently unused (=0 if the firm does not have a line of credit or 
overdraft facility) 
0.07 
Info_adv Dummy (0/1), =1  if  the firm is able to find out when one of his main clients deceives another firm, =0 otherwise  
Age_customer_rel Number of years the firm has done business with its clients in its main business line.  4.10 
Local_market 
Dummy (0/1), =1  if at least 50% of the supplier’s products in its 
main business line are sold to customers located in the same district 
or outside the district but in the same city as the supplier’s plant, =0 
otherwise 
0.41 
Warrantee The percentage of sales carrying a warrantee 90.7 
Certified The percent of  the number of the firm’s products that are certified 46.57 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
 
We show summary statistics for all the variables used in the empirical analysis and defined in Table 1. 
 
 
Variable Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AR_dum 2,157 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
AR_per 2,184 14.02 27.97 0.00 100.00 
AR_days 818 0.36 0.50 0.00 1.00 
AR_discount 823 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
AR_daysover 809 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
AR_overdue 813 18.63 20.47 0.00 100.00 
Age 2,243 2.57 0.74 1.39 3.99 
Emp 2,239 4.94 1.48 0.00 11.16 
Foreign 2,242 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
State 2,242 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Export 2,265 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
No_customers 1,874 3.41 1.75 0.00 14.31 
Sales_largest_cust 1,814 2.10 1.74 0.00 4.60 
No_sup_cust 1,580 1.68 1.02 0.00 4.59 
Herfindahl 541 0.50 0.50 0.01 1.00 
Lower_price 2,222 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
New_product 2,223 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Customized 2,047 37.53 42.05 0.00 100.00 
LC_unused 2,152 0.07 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Info_adv 2,102 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Age_customer_rel 2,201 4.10 1.27 1.00 5.00 
Local_market 2,173 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Warrantee 2,138 90.70 25.17 0.00 100.00 
Certified 2,065 46.57 45.79 0.00 100.00 
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Table 3: Mean Differences of Firm Characteristics by Trade Credit Supply  
 
We show the means of firm characteristics (Panel A) and bargaining power measures (Panel B), disaggregated by 
firms that do and do not offer trade credit. ***, **, and * indicate significant mean differences at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Table 1 reports detailed variable definitions. 
 
 
Variable Name AR_dum=0 AR_dum=1 Significance 
Panel A 
Age 2.60 2.51 *** 
Emp 4.84 5.11 *** 
Foreign 0.06 0.10 *** 
State 0.24 0.19 *** 
Export 0.09 0.11 * 
No_customers 3.22 3.68 *** 
LC_unused 0.06 0.09 *** 
Info_adv 0.22 0.26 ** 
Age_customer_rel 4.04 4.18 *** 
Local_market 0.44 0.34 *** 
Warrantee 89.43 93.46 *** 
Certified 41.42 54.99 *** 
Panel B 
Sales_largest_cust 2.02 2.29 *** 
No_sup_cust 1.61 1.79 * 
Herfindahl 0.31 0.24 *** 
Lower_price 0.41 0.60 *** 
New_product 0.36 0.51 *** 
Customized 37.45 37.60  
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Table 4: Mean Differences of Bargaining Power by Trade Credit Supply Across Sectors 
and Firm Characteristics 
 
We show the average degree of bargaining power (proxied by Lower_price) disaggregated by firms that do and do 
not offer trade credit, across all sectors and firm’s characteristics. ***, **, and * indicate significant mean 
differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 1 reports detailed variable definitions. 
 
 
  
Sector and Firm Characteristics AR_dum=0 AR_dum=1 Sig. 
Garment and Leather  0.39 0.42  
Electronic Equipment 0.50 0.77 *** 
Electronic parts making 0.65 0.77 ** 
Household Electronics 0.57 0.78 ** 
Auto & Auto Parts 0.65 0.77 *** 
Information Technology 0.25 0.38 ** 
Advertising & Marketing 0.23 0.31  
Business Services 0.21 0.39 *** 
Food processing 0.32 0.34  
Chemical Products  0.54 0.75 ** 
Biotech Products & Chinese Medicine  0.15 0.33 * 
Metallurgic Products 0.37 0.57 *** 
Young Firms: Age below median 0.43 0.61 *** 
Mature Firms Age above median  0.39 0.56 *** 
Small  Firms: No. of  Employees below median 0.42 0.60 *** 
Large Firms: No. of Employees below median 0.41 0.59 *** 
Foreign-Owned 0.40 0.62 *** 
Non Foreign-Owned 0.42 0.59 *** 
State-Owned 0.33 0.57 *** 
Non State-Owned 0.44 0.60 *** 
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Table 5:  Correlation Matrix 
We show correlation coefficients among explanatory variables (Panel A) and with dependent variables (Panel B). Table 1 reports detailed variable definitions.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Explanatory Variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Age (1) 1.00                  
Emp (2) 0.29*** 1.00                 
Foreign (3) -0.11*** 0.09*** 1.00                
State (4) 0.40*** 0.21*** -0.15*** 1.00               
Export (5) -0.08*** 0.21*** 0.36*** -0.12*** 1.00              
No_customer (6) 0.01 0.22*** -0.06** 0.03 -0.06*** 1.00             
Sales_largest_cust (7) -0.05** 0.03 0.16*** -0.11*** 0.15*** -0.47*** 1.00            
No_sup_cust (8) -0.01 -0.01 0.11*** 0.04 -0.06* 0.18*** -0.19*** 1.00           
Herfindahl (9) -0.00 -0.06 0.07* 0.01 -0.03 -0.12** 0.07 -0.25*** 1.00          
New_product (10) -0.06*** 0.23*** 0.03 -0.03 -0.06*** 0.20*** -0.02 0.02 -0.14** 1.00         
Lower_price (11) -0.05*** 0.06*** 0.01 -0.07** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.10*** -0.00 0.18*** 0.22*** 1.00        
Customized (12) -0.06*** -0.05** 0.12*** -0.10*** 0.15*** -0.27*** 0.34*** -0.09*** -0.00 -0.00 0.07*** 1.00       
LC_unused (13) -0.02 0.20*** 0.08*** 0.00 0.10*** 0.06** 0.01 -0.07*** 0.10** 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.00 1.00      
Info_adv (14) -0.02 0.01*** 0.04* -0.03 0.05** 0.15*** -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.15*** 0.07*** -0.03 0.07*** 1.00     
Age_customer_rel(15) 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.08*** 0.04* 0.10*** -0.01 0.20*** -0.05** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.10*** 1.00    
Local_market (16) 0.03 -0.22*** -0.14*** 0.05** -0.24*** -0.13*** 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.17*** -0.13*** 0.02 -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.05** 1.00   
Warrantee (17) -0.02 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.03 0.06*** 0.03 0.10*** -0.05** -0.10** 0.13*** 0.01*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.07*** 0.09*** -0.1** 1.00  
Certified (18) -0.01 0.32*** 0.11*** -0.04* 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.06** -0.06** -0.07* 0.30 0.25*** 0.02 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.12*** -0.3** 0.19** 1.00 
 
Panel B:  Dependent Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
AR_dum 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.06*** 0.04* 0.13*** 0.02 0.02 -0.13*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.00 0.0*** 0.07*** 0.05** -0.09*** 0.08*** 0.15*** 
AR_per -0.06*** 0.10*** 0.09*** -0.08*** 0.12*** 0.02 0.09*** -0.05* -0.09** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.10*** 0.09*** 0.16*** 
AR_days -0.05 0.06* -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09** 0.09*** -0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.12*** 
AR_discount -0.03 -0.05 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 0.05 -0.12*** 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.10*** 0.00 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.00 
AR_daysover -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 
AR_overdue -0.02 -0.18*** -0.10*** -0.05 -0.13*** 0.01 0.01 0.07* -0.01 -0.07* 0.09** 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 
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Table 6: Supplier Bargaining Power and the Decision to Offer Trade Credit 
We show estimates of logit regressions. AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city 
dummies. Robust p-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 1 reports detailed variable 
definitions. 
 AR_dum (1) AR_dum (2) AR_dum (3) AR_dum (4) AR_dum (5) AR_dum (6) 
Age -0.22 -0.09 -0.25 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 
 [0.02]*** [0.42] [0.11] [0.16] [0.12] [0.22] 
Emp 0.09 -0.3 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.04 
 [0.06]* [0.64] [0.14] [0.13] [0.27] [0.39] 
Foreign 0.49 0.70 0.47 0.52 0.47 0.49 
 [0.06]* [0.01]*** [0.18] [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.03]** 
State -0.04 -0.05 0.17 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
 [0.83] [0.79] [0.52] [0.91] [0.76] [0.85] 
Export -0.38 -0.44 -0.18 -0.41 -0.38 -0.37 
 [0.11] [0.07]* [0.60] [0.04]** [0.06]* [0.07]* 
No_customers 
 
0.16 
[0.00]*** 
0.16 
[0.00]*** 
0.14 
[0.03]** 
0.13 
[0.00]*** 
0.13 
[0.00]*** 
0.15 
[0.00]*** 
Sales_largest_cust 
 
0.08 
[0.06]*  
    
No_sup_cust 
  
0.11 
[0.09]* 
    
Herfindal 
 
 
  
-0.49 
[0.02]** 
   
Lower_price 
   
 0.53 
[0.00]***  
 
New_product 
   
  0.21 [0.06]* 
 
Customized 
   
    
0.00 
[0.62] 
Constant -2.77 -1.88 -14.29 -2.85 -2.54 -2.51 
 [0.00]*** [0.03]** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.03]** [0.00]*** 
Industry Dummies 
City Dummies 
Observations 
YES 
YES 
1,446 
YES 
YES 
1,157 
YES 
YES 
443 
YES 
YES 
1,713 
YES 
YES 
1,721 
YES 
YES 
1,653 
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
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Table 7: Supplier Bargaining Power and Trade Credit Terms 
We show estimates of OLS regressions in columns (1) and (5) and logit regressions in columns (2) - (4). AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. AR_days is a 
dummy indicating if the firm offers to its customers a number of days larger than the sector average before imposing penalties. AR_discount is a dummy indicating if the firm 
offers a pre-payment discount on credit to its customers. AR_daysover is a dummy equal to one when the number of days used to repay are larger than the days offered. 
AR_overdue is the percentage of annual sales that involves overdue payment. Table 1 reports further variable definitions. We use Sales_largest_cust (Panel A) and Lower_price 
(Panel B) as measures of supplier bargaining power. Regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city dummies.  Robust p-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Sales_largest_cust  Panel B: Lower_price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 AR_per  AR_days AR_discount AR_daysover AR_overdue  AR_per  AR_days AR_discount AR_daysover AR_overdue 
Age -2.42 -0.2 -0.02 0.27 0.46  -1.62 -0.15 -0.06 0.26 0.60 
 [0.03]** [0.19] [0.92] [0.31] [0.74]  [0.11] [0.26] [0.72] [0.24] [0.70] 
Emp 1.63 0.12 -0.15 -0.15 -1.51  1.30 0.10 -0.12 -0.17 -1.39 
 [0.00]*** [0.12] [0.19] [0.31] [0.02]**  [0.02]** [0.14] [0.24] [0.20] [0.03]** 
Foreign 3.12 -0.39 -0.28 0.36 -4.34  4.41 -0.21 -0.06 0.40 -3.25 
 [0.41] [0.29] [0.62] [0.59] [0.09]*  [0.20] [0.47] [0.89] [0.50] [0.19] 
State -2.15 -0.12 -0.29 0.78 -2.02  -2.40 -0.12 -0.24 0.73 -3.06 
 [0.23] [0.67] [0.40] [0.10]* [0.40]  [0.15] [0.66] [0.43] [0.09]* [0.16] 
Export 0.73 -0.48 -0.25 -1.55 -5.29  2.45 -0.03 -0.40 -1.82 -7.17 
 [0.83] [0.25] [0.66] [0.08]* [0.03]  [0.44] [0.92] [0.35] [0.06]* [0.01]** 
No_customers 
 
0.39 
[0.35] 
-0.01 
[0.82] 
0.06 
[0.45] 
0.05 
[0.57] 
0.59 
[0.24] 
 0.04 
[0.92] 
-0.07 
[0.21] 
0.09 
[0.19] 
-0.10 
[0.27] 
-0.49 
[0.28] 
Sales_largest_cust 1.53 0.01 -8.36e-03 0.32 1.65       
 [0.00]*** [0.07]* [0.12] [0.01]** [0.01]***       
Lowerprice 
     
  5.64 
[0.00]*** 
0.32 
[0.08]* 
0.15 
[0.53] 
0.37 
[0.25] 
2.95 
[0.10]* 
Constant 
 -0.30 [0.95] 
-0.32 
[0.77] 
0.12 
[0.92] 
-15.40 
[0.00]*** 
 
25.07 
[0.00]*** 
  
0.31 
[0.95] 
 
-0.07 
[0.95] 
 
0.22 
[0.86] 
 
-14.24 
[0.00]*** 
 
31.83 
[0.01]*** 
Industry Dummies 
City Dummies 
Observations 
YES 
YES 
1,459 
NO 
YES 
566 
YES 
YES 
550 
YES 
YES 
433 
YES 
YES 
561 
 YES 
YES 
1,733 
NO 
YES 
691 
YES 
YES 
674 
YES 
YES 
535 
YES 
YES 
687 
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.14  0.10 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.14 
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Table 8: How Do Firms With Low Bargaining Power Finance Trade Credit Provision? 
We report estimates of logit regressions in Columns (1) and (2) and OLS regressions in Columns (3) and (4). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts 
receivable. AR_per is the proportion of monthly sales sold on credit. Table 1 reports further variable definitions. We use Sales_largest_cust (Panel A), 
No_sup_cust (Panel B), Lower_price (Panel C), and New_product (Panel D), as measures of supplier bargaining power. All regressions include 12 sector 
dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Sales_largest_cust  Panel B: No_Sup_ cust 
  Low BP High BP Low BP High BP  Low BP High BP Low BP High BP 
 AR_dum (1) 
AR_dum 
(2) 
AR_per 
(3) 
AR_per 
(4) 
 AR_dum 
(1) 
AR_dum 
(2) 
AR_per 
(3) 
AR_per 
(4) 
L_Age -0.14 -0.09 -6.61 -0.34  0.09 -0.40 1.15 -4.42     
  [0.46] [0.92] [0.02]** [0.81]  [0.65] [0.01]*** [0.56] [0.05]** 
L_emp 0.02 0.12 2.57 1.39  -0.10 0.05 -0.68 1.11 
  [0.82] [0.22] [0.06]* [0.11]  [0.29] [0.55] [0.49] [0.39] 
Foreign 0.76 -0.25 -2.43 -4.85  1.26 0.90 3.53 5.58 
  [0.05]** [0.71] [0.71] [0.37]  [0.06] [0.02]** [0.53] [0.38] 
State -0.08 -0.17 -1.00 -1.68  0.32 0.09 -0.69 0.26 
  [0.81] [0.61] [0.82] [0.49]  [0.30] [0.76] [0.83] [0.94] 
Export -0.50 0.06 0.21 -0.47  0.05 -0.32 -3.33 9.62 
  [0.24] [0.92] [0.97] [0.08]*  [0.92] [0.38] [0.58] [0.11] 
No_customers 
 
0.17 
[0.04]** 
0.19 
[0.00]*** 
1.32 
[0.19] 
14.03 
[0.10]* 
 0.07 
[0.37] 
0.25 
[0.00]*** 
-0.04 
[0.96] 
0.47 
[0.60] 
LC_unused 0.60 0.12 17.27 -4.37  2.42 -0.52 20.39 1.58 
  [0.29] [0.87] [0.08]* [0.28]  [0.00]*** [0.20] [0.02]** [0.80] 
Constant -14.97 -3.76 2.62 1.09  -2.70 -2.06 -1.73 34.19 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.73] [0.90]  [0.00]*** [0.17] [0.77] [0.15] 
Industry Dummies 
City Dummies 
Observations 
YES 
YES 
399 
YES 
YES 
449 
YES 
YES 
406 
YES 
YES 
476 
 YES 
YES 
421 
YES 
YES 
515 
YES 
YES 
427 
YES 
YES 
517 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.15  0.12 0.13 0.13 0.17 
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 Panel C: Lower_price  Panel D: New_product 
  Low BP High BP Low BP High BP  Low BP High BP Low BP High BP 
 AR_dum (1) 
AR_dum 
(2) 
AR_per 
(3) 
AR_per 
(4) 
 AR_dum 
(1) 
AR_dum 
(2) 
AR_per 
(3) 
AR_per 
(4) 
L_Age 
 
-0.17 
[0.19] 
-0.03 
[0.80] 
-2.90 
[0.10]* 
-0.51 
[0.44] 
 -0.17 
[0.22] 
-0.08 
[0.54] 
-2.94 
[0.16] 
-1.42 
[0.40] 
L_emp 0.02 0.09 1.20 1.36  -0.01 0.05 0.07 1.90 
  [0.76] [0.16] [0.20] [0.06]*  [0.84] [0.47] [0.95] [0.05]* 
Foreign 0.67 0.41 8.96 -0.57  0.31 0.68 2.90 2.46 
  [0.03]** [0.25] [0.09]* [0.90]  [0.35] [0.04]** [0.60] [0.61] 
State 0.25 -0.30 -0.84 -4.44  0.33 -0.16 -1.52 -2.41 
  [0.24] [0.19] [0.76] [0.04]**  [0.17] [0.54] [0.65] [0.40] 
Export -0.40 -0.30 0.36 3.84  -0.35 -0.25 -1.4 4.30 
  [0.15] [0.40] [0.94] [0.44]  [0.24] [0.41] [0.76] [0.38] 
No_customers 
 
0.10 
[0.04]** 
0.20 
[0.00]*** 
-0.23 
[0.72] 
0.33 
[0.53] 
 0.13 
[0.01]*** 
0.14 
[0.00]*** 
-0.49 
[0.50] 
0.23 
[0.69] 
LC_unused 0.75 -0.70 6.51 -2.01  0.69 0.19 8.44 2.90 
  [0.02]** [0.18] [0.10]* [0.72]  [0.05]** [0.70] [0.09]* [0.69] 
Constant -2.02 -3.86 5.43 -3.20  -1.87 -3.51 9.74 -1.22 
 [0.01]*** [0.00]*** [0.43] [0.72]  [0.11] [0.01]*** [0.32] [0.86] 
Industry Dummies 
City Dummies 
Observations 
YES 
YES 
863 
YES 
YES 
802 
YES 
YES 
871 
YES 
YES 
811 
 YES 
YES 
660 
YES 
YES 
735 
YES 
YES 
667 
YES 
YES 
746 
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09  0.08 0.10 0.12 0.09 
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Table 9: Bargaining Power versus Information Advantage 
We report estimates of logit regressions in Columns (1) and (3), and of OLS regressions in Column (2). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable. AR_per is the 
percent of monthly sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if the firm offers to its customers a number of days larger than 30 before imposing penalties. Panel A, B, and 
C control for whether the supplier has information on customer’s deception (Info_adv), for the proximity of customers (Local_market), and for the age of the supplier/customer 
relation (Age_customer_rel), respectively. Table 1 reports further variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are shown in 
parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
 AR_dum (1) 
AR_per 
(2) 
AR_days 
(3) 
 AR_dum 
(1) 
AR_per 
(2) 
AR_days 
(3) 
 AR_dum 
(1) 
AR_per 
(2) 
AR_days 
(3) 
Age -0.21 -2.30 -0.49  -0.23 -2.44 -0.64  -0.23 -2.64 -0.64 
 [0.03]** [0.04]** [0.26]  [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.14]  [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.14] 
Emp 0.09 1.63 -0.26  0.09 1.66 -0.21  0.09 1.56 -0.21 
 [0.06]* [0.00]*** [0.10]*  [0.08]* [0.00]*** [0.20]  [0.07]* [0.01]*** [0.20] 
Foreign 0.50 3.62 0.14  0.50 3.32 0.11  0.49 3.01 0.11 
 [0.05]* [0.35] [0.09]*  [0.05]** [0.39] [0.17]  [0.06]* [0.43] [0.7] 
State -0.04 -2.02 -0.32  -0.02 -2.10 -0.41  -0.04 -2.23 -0.41 
 [0.80] [0.27] [0.40]  [0.92] [0.30] [0.26]  [0.80] [0.21] [0.26] 
Export -0.37 1.18 -0.16  -0.40 1.01 -0.12  -0.37 0.56 -0.12 
 [0.13] [0.75] [0.59]  [0.11] [0.78] [0.70]  [0.12] [0.87] [0.70] 
No_customers 
 
0.15 
[0.00]*** 
0.35 
[0.42] 
-0.01 
[0.83] 
 0.16 
[0.00]*** 
0.42 
[0.33] 
-0.02 
[0.76] 
 0.16 
[0.00]*** 
0.36 
[0.40] 
-0.02 
[0.76] 
Sales_largest_cust 0.08 1.54 0.001  0.08 1.55 0.01  0.07 1.41 0.01 
 [0.07]* [0.00]*** [0.10]*  [0.05]* [0.00]*** [0.04]**  [0.07]* [0.00]*** [0.04]** 
Info_adv 0.16 2.39 0.47         
 [0.18] [0.10]* [0.02]**         
Local_market     -0.10 0.45 0.54     
     [0.40] [0.77] [0.02]**     
Age_customer_rel         0.04 0.91 0.54 
         [0.43] [0.07]* [0.02]** 
Constant -2.82 -1.63 0.09  -2.51 -0.44 0.09  -2.30 -3.32 0.01 
 [0.00]*** [0.77] [0.94]  [0.00]*** [0.94] [0.943]  [0.00]*** [0.57] [0.94] 
Ind. Dummies 
City Dummies 
Observations 
YES 
YES 
1,432 
YES 
YES 
1,443 
NO 
YES 
517 
 YES 
YES 
1,443 
YES 
YES 
1,456 
NO 
YES 
520 
 YES 
YES 
1,439 
YES 
YES 
1,452 
NO 
YES 
520 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.10 0.11 0.08  0.10 0.10 0.07  0.10 0.11 0.07 
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Table 10: Bargaining Power versus Product Quality 
We report estimates of logit regressions in columns (1) and (3) and of OLS regressions in column (2). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts 
receivable. AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if the firm offers to its customers a number of days larger than 
30 before imposing penalties. Panels A and B control for the percentage of goods carrying a warrantee (Warrantee) and for the proportion of firm’s products that 
are certified (Certified), respectively. Table 1 reports further variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-
values are shown in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 AR_dum (1) 
AR_per 
(2) 
AR_days 
     (3) 
 AR_dum 
(1) 
AR_per 
(2) 
AR_days 
     (3) 
Age -0.11 -2.14 0.07  -0.09 -1.99 0.08 
 [0.16] [0.06]* [0.86]  [0.30] [0.11] [0.85] 
Emp 0.04 1.31 -0.11  0.04 1.04 -0.09 
 [0.36] [0.04]** [0.47]  [0.33] [0.14] [0.60] 
Foreign 0.48 4.13 0.09  0.50 7.93 0.02 
 [0.02]** [0.32] [0.22]  [0.03]** [0.11] [0.77] 
State -0.03 -3.30 -0.14  0.01 -2.93 0.12 
 [0.79] [0.08]* [0.65]  [0.94] [0.15] [0.73] 
Export -0.37 6.33 -0.08  -0.36 4.37 -0.01 
 [0.06]* [0.14] [0.78]  [0.07]* [0.38] [0.97] 
No_customers 
 
0.13 
[0.00]*** 
-0.34 
[0.44] 
-0.05 
[0.39] 
 0.13 
[0.00]*** 
-0.28 
[0.58] 
-0.09 
[0.13] 
New_product 
 
0.21 
[0.06]* 
2.67 
[0.10]* 
0.21 
[0.07]* 
 0.20 
[0.09]* 
3.38 
[0.07]* 
0.41 
[0.06]* 
Warrantee 
 
0.001 
[0.66] 
0.02 
[0.59] 
-0.00 
[0.42] 
    
Certified 
 
 
  
 0.4e-03 
[0.76] 
0.01 
[0.68] 
0.05** 
[0.05] 
Constant -2.57 3.59 0.52  -2.72 1.96 0.20 
 [0.00]*** [0.57] [0.54]  [0.00]*** [0.73] [0.81] 
Ind.Dummies 
City Dummies 
Observations 
YES 
YES 
1,701 
YES 
YES 
1,446 
NO 
YES 
589 
 YES 
YES 
1,610 
YES 
YES 
1,214 
NO 
YES 
488 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.08 0.11 0.06  0.08 0.11 0.06 
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Table 11: Bargaining Power and Trade Credit for Selected Sectors 
We report estimates of logit regressions in column (1) and (3) and of OLS regressions in column (2). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts 
receivable. AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. Panels A and B show the results for two large sectors, Auto and Auto Parts and Electronic 
Equipment, respectively. We use two different proxies of bargaining power, Sales_largest_cust  in Columns (1) and (2) and  Lower_price in Columns (3) and 
(4). Table 1 reports further variable definitions. All regressions include 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Auto & Auto Parts  Panel B: Electronics Equipment 
 AR_dum (1) 
AR_per 
(2) 
AR_dum 
(3) 
AR_per 
(4) 
 AR_dum 
(1) 
AR_per 
(2) 
AR_dum 
(3) 
AR_per 
(4) 
Age -0.17 -4.82 -0.15 -3.33  0.05 -2.59 -0.43 -3.69 
 [0.41] [0.11] [0.45] [0.24]  [0.89] [0.63] [0.07]* [0.27] 
Emp 0.23 2.50 0.15 2.39  -0.09 0.61 0.07 1.41 
 [0.04]** [0.10] [0.13] [0.10]*  [0.66] [0.81] [0.65] [0.49] 
Foreign 0.27 3.99 0.68 10.06  -0.05 1.60 -0.17 3.61 
 [0.57] [0.70] [0.16] [0.29]  [0.94] [0.86] [0.77] [0.70] 
State 0.55 0.78 0.46 -0.82  0.15 -1.95 0.05 -2.73 
 [0.16] [0.88] [0.20] [0.86]  [0.85] [0.85] [0.91] [0.61] 
Export 0.10 16.85 -0.08 15.04  0.66 -3.44 -0.69 1.90 
 [0.88] [0.18] [0.90] [0.17]  [0.40] [0.69] [0.19] [0.82] 
No_customer 0.22 0.69 0.14 -0.59  0.18 0.88 0.18 -1.85 
 [0.02]** [0.62] [0.09]* [0.63]  [0.29] [0.64] [0.09]* [0.21] 
Sales_largest_cust 0.37 4.48      0.01 4.91   
 [0.00] *** [0.00]***      [0.23] [0.01]***   
Lower_price   0.72 6.17    1.02 10.38 
   [0.01]** [0.10]*    [0.00]*** [0.03]** 
Constant -2.14 0.81 -0.99 20.89  0.58 -18.44 0.97 28.14 
 [0.00]*** [0.93] [0.16] [0.23]  [0.69] [0.34] [0.29] [0.14] 
City Dummy YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Observations 273 286 319 323  123 125 151 155 
Pseudo R_sq. 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10  0.15 0.18 0.14 0.14 
 
 
